Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Cowles Foundation

1-1-1997

Expanding the Scope of Individual Risk Management: Moral
Hazard and Other Behavioral Considerations
Robert J. Shiller

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Shiller, Robert J., "Expanding the Scope of Individual Risk Management: Moral Hazard and Other
Behavioral Considerations" (1997). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1393.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1393

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
AT YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 2125, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut 06520

COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1145

Note: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers are preliminary materials
circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment.
Requests for single copies of a Paper will be filled by the
Cowles Foundation within the limits of the supply. References
in publications to Discussion Papers (other than mere
acknowledgment by a writer that he has access to such
unpublished material) should be cleared with the author to
protect the tentative character of these papers.

EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF INDIVIDUAL RISK MANAGEMENT:
MORAL HAZARD AND OTHER BEHAVIORAL CONSIDERATIONS
Robert J. Shiller
January 1997

Expanding the Scope of Individual Risk Management:
Moral Hazard and Other Behavioral Considerations
Robert J. Shiller
Abstract
There is a large potential for improving individual risk management through new
risk management contracts and associated new index-settled derivatives. However,
there are some difficult problems in designing contracts so that they will be used
effectively. Individuals have idiosyncratic individual risks that can be hedged only
at some real resource cost due to moral hazard. Individuals seem to exhibit
behavior indicative of lack of appreciation of the principles of risk management.
These problems are discussed, and some potential new risk management contracts
that would make improvements in the management of major income risks are
proposed.

Despite a proliferation of derivative contracts around the world in recent decades, most of
the risks that people face are still not being effectively hedged. Consider, for example, the
risk to personal income that the representative individual in a country has. We can obtain
an impression of the potential magnitude of this risk by looking at data on income measured
by per capita gross domestic products (GDPs). Estimates of the uncertainty of log present
values of 54 countries’ per capita GDPs are presented in Table 1, based on an autoregressive
model for log per capita real GDPs with Summers–Heston [1991] annual data 1950–90,
using methods developed by Campbell and Shiller [1989] and described in Shiller [1993a,b]
(see also Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay [1997], Chapter 7). The conditional standard
deviations of the log present values are often over 30%, indicating great uncertainty about
the standard of living for the representative individual in these countries.1
Presentated at the conference “Risks Involving Derivatives and Other New Financial Instruments,” sponsored by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, Siena Italy, December 16–17, 1996. The
author is indebted to Emilio Barone, Karl E. Case, Massimo Massa, Marco Del Negro, Allan Weiss
and Paul Willen for helpful discussions. This research was supported by the US National Science
Foundation.
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The numbers in Table 1 for individual countries must be interpreted with some caution. When
a longer historical time series is used for the US alone, the estimated US uncertainty rises dramatically,
see Shiller [1993a]. These numbers are presented here only to get a rough indication of the typical
uncertainty that countries face.
1

This risk is certainly not being hedged. To try to do that with any seriousness under
present institutional arrangements, people would need to take massive short positions in
claims on income flows that correlate highly with their own national incomes. Certainly,
nations do not take massive short positions in their own stock markets. The positions would
certainly have to be massive, given that present values of country’s GDPs are one or two
orders of magnitudes larger than values of the same country’s stock market. Moreover,
attempting to hedge one’s national income risk by such a method cannot work well, since
there does not appear to be much correlation between present values of national incomes and
stock market prices, see Shiller [1993a]. Plainly, this GDP risk is just not being hedged.
The risks to present values of GDPs are not the only risks that individuals face.
Individuals within a country face income risks that are larger than GDP risks, since there is
also individual variation in incomes around the national incomes. Moreover, individuals
also face substantial risks by holding undiversified investments, risks not always measured
by changes in their reported incomes. Most people in the United States and many other
countries hold a substantial fraction of their wealth in the form of their own dwellings, a
single and highly speculative (given the observed behavior of local real estate markets)
investment.

Cash-Settled Index-Based Futures Markets
for Major Economic Risks
I have argued in my book Macro Markets [1993a] and elsewhere [Shiller, 1993b] that new
institutional arrangements are needed that will make it possible for people to hedge their
major economic risks. Markets for long term claims on income flows, such as national
incomes or occupational incomes should be set up.2 Moreover, futures markets for illiquid
assets such as single family homes should also be created (See Case Shiller and Weiss
[1993], Shiller [1993a].)
One idea for a market that would permit hedging of long-term income risks as measured
by income indices was called perpetual futures. A perpetual futures contract is a cashsettled index-based futures contract designed to generate a price that is in effect a price of
a claim on an infinite stream of future income index values, and to allow hedging of these
present values. With such contracts, people ought to be able to buy or sell, in effect, perpetual claims on the claim on he infinite stream of the future income index. The settlement
2

Robert Merton [1983] has advocated a related idea, government issuance of consumptionindexed bonds, as part of his plan for consumption-indexed public pension plans. Marshall et al.
[1992] proposed creating options and swaps on business cycle variables such as consumer confidence
indices.
2

st every period (paid by a short in one contract to a long in one contract) is given by:
st ' ( f t & ft&1) % (It & rt&1 ft&1)

(1)

where ft is the price of the futures contract at time t, It is the index (usually a measure of
some income flow at time t), and rt–1 is the return on an alternative asset between t–1 and t,
such as the one-period nominal interest rate.3 I argued [1993a] that if provisions are made
in the contract that would rule out extraneous bubbles, then the futures price ft would in
effect price the claim on the income stream It, It+1, .... Note that if ft is indeed the price of
a claim on the income stream It, It+1, ... then this settlement is nothing other than the excess
return between investing in a claim on the income stream and investing in the alternative
asset.
If perpetual futures contracts were available on national incomes, individuals in a given
country could hedge some of their own lifetime income risks by taking short positions in the
perpetual futures market for their own country. They could then also effectively invest in
the rest of the world by taking long positions in the futures markets for other countries. The
general equilibrium for the world economy, assuming utility-maximizing individuals, is
described in Shiller and Athanasoulis [1995] and Athanasoulis and Shiller [1996].
Other kinds of cash-settled index futures could be used to make liquid some presently
illiquid investments, notably real estate. Futures and options markets can be set up that are
cash settled based on real estate price indices. Real estate futures, both commercial and
residential, were created in London in 1991, unsuccessfully. In 1994 Barclays de Zoete
Wedd (BZW) created Property Index Certificates (Pics) which are essentially bonds whose
dividends are tied to a commercial real estate price index. In November 1996 BZW also
created what are essentially UK commercial real estate index settled futures, although there
is no clearing house and BZW is always one side of the contract. An industry-wide group
led by AMP Asset Management (the fund management component of Australia Mutual
Provident), plans to start true index-settled UK commercial real estate futures markets in
1997.4
A serious potential problem for any real estate derivative instruments is that, because
of unmeasured heterogeneity in the actual real estate, the indices may not be reliable guides
to values. These problems could be reduced if repeat sales price indices are used for
settlement (Case and Shiller [1989], Case Shiller and Weiss [1991], Shiller [1991], Shiller
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Anthony Neuberger [1996] later described a similar idea, which he called “Peter Pan futures.”
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"A Dip Into Derivatives,” Financial Times, November 8, 1996, p. 12.
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[1993a,b]).5 The potential improvement in real estate price indices using repeat sales
methods may be especially high for individual homes, for which there are vast numbers of
sales. There at present no liquid markets for home price index risk; and creating such
markets would be of great importance.

Institutions to Allow Individuals to Manage their Income Risks
While futures and options contracts could be created today that would allow people with
sufficient margin to hedge these risks, there are still institutional changes that must be made
to allow individuals to hedge effectively.
An important problem that individuals would face in attempting to hedge their personal
income risks or real estate risks on such markets is that they would generally not have the
margin be able to commit to such a contract for very long. Given that both expected present
values of lifetime incomes and values of single family homes can often move up or down
by amounts of the same magnitude as a year’s income, and given that most people do not
have savings that are much more than this, they would tend to be unable to meet margin
calls.
What is needed to make such markets work for individuals are retail contracts that
commit them to pay out of their own future incomes if their incomes should unexpectedly
increase, and to receive income if their incomes should unexpectedly decrease.
Bankruptcy laws today present an obstacle to the creation of lifetime income risk
management contracts for individuals. An individual who has a favorable turn in his or her
lifetime income, and who would then be on the losing end of the risk-management contract,
may be able to declare bankruptcy to wipe out the contracts. Bankruptcy can be generated
artificially to abrogate the contract, while preserving the basic human capital source of
future income. It is also possible also that individuals can later challenge contracts on a
legal principle against enslavement.
It is plausible that someday it will be legally possible for individuals to commit to pay
out of their lifetime income. Governments ultimately recognize the value of having
enforceable contracts, and devote resources to enforcing such contracts. This does not mean
that governments need enforce all contracts that people make to pay out of their lifetime
income; people who sell themselves into slavery on a bet may still be protected from their
own impulsiveness. Governments need only sanction contracts that serve a sensible riskmanagement purpose.
5

The Chicago Board of Trade in 1993 announced its intention to produce cash-settled index-based
real estate futures based on repeat sales indices produced by our firm, Case Shiller Weiss, Inc.,
Cambridge MA. These plans have been put on indefinite hold, however.
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Any effective risk management program for individuals would have to be managed by
some institutions that package these contracts effectively for them, and market and service
them. I will imagine here that the risk management contracts are offered to individuals by
insurance companies, who might then hedge the risk they acquire by writing these insurance
contracts in the index-settled futures markets.

Moral Hazard and Individual Risk Management Contracts
Insurance contracts for individuals that pay them when some income aggregate that is
correlated with their own incomes declines, and requires them to pay when it increases, will
help risk management a great deal. Moreover, retail insurance contracts that pay
homeowners when the a single-family home price index for their geographic area decreases,
and requires them to pay when it increases, will also help. However, retail markets for such
income insurance would function much better if the settlements could be based in part on
the individual’s own income or own home price. Certainly, since the correlation between
any income aggregate and an individual’s income is bound to be less than perfect, there will
be cases when the income aggregate moves up while the individual’s income moves down.
Since the correlation between the home price index and the individual’s own home value
is less than perfect, there will be cases when the home price index moves up when the
individual’s home price moves down. These circumstances would put the hedged individual
in a doubly unfortunate position, having to pay on the futures contract at the same time that
own economic well being has decreased. It would be natural in creating retail insurance
contracts to specify in advance that a person in such a circumstance need not pay in full even
though the income or price index has increased. Thus, it is very natural to create retail
contracts that depend in one way or another on the individual’s own circumstances.
If we create individual insurance contracts, then we must face up to the “moral hazard”
that individuals, once their income or other measure of economic well being is insured, will
“get lazy” and not work so much any more, hoping to benefit on their risk contracts from
having lower earned income. Of course, there could be contract provisions against people’s
quitting their jobs to take long vacations, but there are still many steps that could be taken
by individuals to create the appearance of lower earning potential that would be difficult for
the insurer to detect. The individual could just not try as hard on the job, and thereby risk
not being selected to promotion to higher paying jobs. The person could manage to lose a
high-paying stressful or unpleasant job, and then substitute a more congenial low-paying
job. Obviously, the insurer would find it difficult to prove in court that these changes were
purposeful for benefiting from the risk management contract, and not imposed on the
individual by life’s exigencies.
5

The presence of risk-management contracts may also serve to motivate people to switch
their income-producing activities to the non-market or underground sector. Thus, for
example, people may work only part time, and earn the rest of their income for odd jobs paid
in cash, so as to reduce their reported income for contract settlement purposes. They may
add rooms to their own home or repair the roof on their own home, rather than hire
professionals to do these things. Contract provisions could expressly require that such
activities be reported as income-producing activities, and those who violate the contract in
a major way could be subject to strict penalties. One may doubt that insurance companies
could enforce such contracts well; indeed, many governments seem to have largely given
up on taxing such unreported income. But private insurance companies may have some
advantages over governments in this respect: they do not have to agree to insure parties
whose circumstances makes it appear likely that such non-market income opportunities will
be important, they do not need to worry about the appearance of inequity if certain parties
appear to be unfairly advantaged by the contracts, and they do not have to worry about the
political repercussions of pursuing people for not reporting such non-market incomes. Still,
there will remain some risk that people who have signed income risk management contracts
will, by altering the nature of their activities, succeed in underreporting their true income.
Insurance policies on the market value of an individual’s home are also subject to moral
hazard. If an individual knew that the house’s value is completely insured, then the
individual has less incentive to maintain the home properly, and may even alter the home
to idiosyncratic tastes in such as way as to harm its market value.
The impact of such moral hazard can be reduced to the extent that the contract can be
written in terms of factors that correlate with the individual’s income or home price but
which are not under the control of the individual. Let us consider how the income risk
management contracts should be designed in the case where there is an imperfect indicator
of the individual’s earning potential, let us say the average per capita income for persons in
that individual’s category. We want to characterize the optimal contract, which specifies
how much the payments to be made depend on the income indicator and how much on the
individual’s own income.
To simplify the exposition, let us consider a simple model influenced by the optimal
employment insurance literature and the literature on moral hazard (e.g., Holmstrom [1978],
Mirrlees [1976], and Ross [1973]). Mine is a one-period model (the period is a lifetime
long). The contract payments are presumably made evenly throughout the lifetime, not all
at once, though the model is represented as occurring at a point in time. All individuals have
the same utility function U(C,E) in terms of two parameters, which I shall call consumption
(C) and ease (E). This utility function follows in the tradition of utility functions for both
consumption and effort or action that are widely used in the moral hazard literature.

6

The individual’s earned income is Y = A + W(1 – E), where A > 0 is an indicator of
aggregate per capita income for this individual’s occupation or country, 1 is the total stock
of ease that could be given up for the purpose of earning more income, and W > 0 is the rate
at which income is generated by foregoing ease, the wage to sacrificing ease, so to speak.
The two sources of noise are A and W, both assumed known to the individual when he or she
makes the consumption and ease decision, but unknown to everyone when the riskmanagement contract is signed. The person signs a risk management contract with an
insurer that promises to pay to that person an amount g(A,Y), so that the person can have
consumption C = Y + g(A,Y) = A + W(1 – E) + g(A, A + W(1 –E)). The function g(A,Y) has
two observables as arguments, the aggregate component of income A, shared by everyone
and hence not subject to moral hazard influences, and the individual’s own income Y. In
equilibrium, W will later also be revealed to the contractor, since all individuals have the
same utility function and differ from each other only in terms of W, so that there is a one-toone correspondence between Y and W, given A. There still will be a moral hazard problem,
since individuals will be consuming more ease than they otherwise would in order not to
lose out on their contract returns. It will be apparent that the problem set up here closely
resembles that of Holmstrom [1979].
Let us suppose, to simplify this analysis of moral hazard problems, that the insurer is
risk neutral and competitive with other such insurers, so that the contract must have the
property that Úg(A,Y) = 0 where Ú is the expectations operator.6
For the individual who has signed a contract specifying payment g(A,Y), the utility
maximization problem is one without uncertainty, since the individual is supposed to know
both A and Y. The utility maximizing amount of ease E is that which satisfies the Euler
equation:
UC(E)(1 & g Y)W ' UE(E).
The problem for the contract designer, given probability distributions for both A > 0 and
W > 0, is to choose the function g(A,Y) in such a way as to maximize expected utility of the
individual and such that Úg(A,Y) = 0. Closed form solutions of this contract designer
problem for simple utility functions and for simple assumptions about the joint distribution
of A and W do not in general appear to be possible to obtain. The optimal function g(A,Y)
will in general be nonlinear, except in special cases. Holmstrom and Milgrom [1987] have
shown that in a problem like this, if utilities are additively separable and of the exponential
6

There are other more complicated stories that could be told, where the individual is sharing risks
with others, and where the expected gain from the contract depends on the covariance of its payments
with other’s incomes.
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class, then the g(A,Y) will be linear; however the exponential utility has some undesirable
properties (consumption will sometimes be negative).
To illustrate the nature of the solution, I assumed a Cobb–Douglas utility function
U(C,E) = C E1– , and I approximated the function g(A,Y) with a linear function, g(A,Y) = g0
– gAA – gyY, 0 # gY # 1, 0 # gA # 1 – gY. (Note that shocks to A will affect settlement both
directly through the gA term and indirectly through the gY term, to the extent that the shock
to A affects individual income Y.) Substituting ((1 – gY)(A + W – EW) + g0 – gAA) for C in
the utility function and differentiating, we find that the optimized value of E is then:
E '

(1 & )((1 & gY & g A)A % g0)
(1 & gY)W

% 1 & .

(2)

Given that E will be so chosen, the g0 must be chosen so that the expected payout is zero.
This g0 is thus:

gY % g A &
g0 '

g Y(1 & )(1 & gA & g Y)
(1 & gY)

Ú(A) % g Y Ú(W)
.

1 &
1 %
g
1 & gY Y

(3)

The income earned by the person who is subject to the contract is:

Y ' 1 &

(1 & )(1 & gA & g Y)
1 & gy

A % W &

(1 & )g0
1 & gy

.

(4)

So that income is positively impacted by A and W. Note that in some realizations income
may be negative, but consumption will never be negative.
Average income Ȳ for people who share the same A can be found by substituting ÚW
for W in equation (4). This might be per capita national income if the grouping to which A
corresponds is a country, or average occupational income if the grouping is an occupation.
We may, using the expression for Ȳ , rewrite the risk sharing rule g(A,Y) in terms of Ȳ
and Y rather than A and Y. Before we do this, though, we must specify what fraction of
people are covered by the risk management contract. One extreme to consider is that in
which no one else is covered by the contract: this is a realistic situation when the contracts
are new. In this case, we would set g0 = gY = gA = 0 in (4) in determining Ȳ , though of
8

course not when considering the optimal risk-sharing rule for the subject person; let us call
the risk-sharing rule for this person in this case j(Ȳ, Y) ' j0 & jȲȲ & jYY . Then, while jY
equals gY, jȲ equals gA/ ; jȲ is greater than gA because aggregate income moves less than one
for one with the shock to income A. For example, if A falls, then people will work harder
(E will go down) and income will not fall as much as A has. Another extreme to consider
in determining Ȳ is a situation in which everyone is covered by the contract, in which
everyone has the values of g0, gY and gA that the subject person has; let us call the risksharing rule in this case k(Ȳ, Y) ' k0 & kȲ Ȳ & kY Y . We then have, as before, that kY = gY,
but now kȲ ' gA/(1 & ((1 & )(1 & g A & gY)/(1 & g Y))) . If gA > 0, then kȲ < jȲ , in effect
since with other people hedging, they will not need to offset shocks to their income by
changing their level of E, and so shocks to A will feed more fully into income when other
people are hedging. In general, gA # kȲ #jȲ .
I wrote a computer program that performs a grid search over values of the parameters
gA and gY to find the parameter values that maximize expected utility. For each value of the
pair gA and gY, under the assumption that A and W are independently lognormally distributed
the program produced g0, using (3) and the expression for the mean of the lognormal
distribution. The program estimates for each parameter pair gA and gY the expected utility
by averaging 1,000,000 randomly generated utilities, using (2) substituted into the utility
function and a lognormal random number generator. We may then choose the gA and gY to
achieve highest expected utility.
We may now go through various special cases to give us some understanding of the
nature of the optimal risk-management contract. First, it should be obvious that if A = W
= 0, that is if there is no risk, then gA, jȲ and kȲ are irrelevant and gY = jY = kY = 0. It does
not matter whether the contract is made to vary with the aggregate income Ȳ if aggregate
income does not vary, but it does matter whether the contract is made to vary with own
income, since this creates a distortion, altering people’s behavior. If gY is greater than zero,
then the contract functions like a distortionary tax with tax proceeds refunded, and this is
welfare reducing.
If A = 0 and W > 0, then while gA, jȲ and kȲ are still irrelevant, now gY, jY and kY are
greater than zero. While making these greater than zero creates a distortion, doing this also
serves a risk reduction function. If W is small, then gY, jY and kY will also be small, since the
cost of the distortion is not offset by much risk reduction. If W gets very large, then gY, jY
and kY all approach one, though they are far below one for any realistic values of W.
If A > 0 and W = 0, then, regardless of the magnitude of A, gY = 0 and gA = 1, jȲ ' 1/ .
and kȲ ' 1 . There is no need for a distortionary gY, and the entire shock should be hedged.
Note that jȲ is greater than one: one ideally hedges aggregate income risks more than onefor-one, since if others are not hedged, they are working harder when income is down,

9

sheltering aggregate income from some of the shock to their budget constraint: to eliminate
shocks to one’s budget constraint, and to avoid having to work harder as do others, one
needs to hedge more.
If A > 0 and W > 0 (there is both aggregate uncertainty and individual uncertainty) then
in general gA, jȲ and kȲ will be greater than zero, and gY, jY and kY will also be greater than
zero. The optimal contract pays off in relation both to aggregate income risks and to
individual income risks. The payoff to A risks now, however, becomes less than one to one,
and gA + gY becomes less than one. Indeed, even if we constrain gY to be zero, the optimal
gA is less than one. The response to aggregate income Ȳ , that is the coefficients jȲ and KȲ ,
can be either greater or less than one. Of course, at the other extreme, if we constrain gA to
be zero, then the optimal gY will be less than one, and welfare will be reduced.
An important lesson from this analysis is that while risk management contracts that
aggregate income are useful, it is better if the contracts respond to individual income as
well. The “moral hazard” problem should be thought of as a distortion problem, like the
distortion imposed by taxes, and not as a problem that hampers insurance company’s ability
to issue income risk management contracts.7

The Failure of Most Current Hedgers to Hedge Properly
In addition to the moral hazard concerns discussed above, there are other concerns about
human behavior patterns that may inhibit proper use of risk management contracts: the
ambitious new risk management contracts proposed in this paper may seem unrealistic,
given the public’s slowness to adopt enlightened risk management policy, even where the
institutions already exist for such risk management. Existing risk management opportunities
are not generally properly exploited.
It was noted above that few people today take short positions in their own country’s
stock market, as would generally be optimal assuming a positive correlation between the
stock market and the people’s own personal incomes. Moreover, most people do not
properly diversify their investment portfolio internationally, even though they could do so
under contemporary institutional arrangements.
People show a tendency to wish to contract in nominal terms, rather than to have their
contracts indexed to consumer price indices. People usually, in low or moderate inflation
countries, seem to prefer that long-term pension payments, child support, or alimony claims
7

The moral hazard problem that was discussed above is conceptually separate from a selection
bias problem: insurance companies that offered these policies to the public would risk attracting the
laziest people. Selection bias problems can be addressed using techniques already well known in the
insurance industry, for example offering only group policies.
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be defined in fixed dollar terms, despite the urging of economists that indexed contracts are
preferable. There appear to be many reasons why people do not want indexation; a
prominent reason among them seems to be an imperfect understanding of the extent of longterm risks faced, a failure to add up the short-term uncertainties to arrive at a proper measure
of long-term uncertainty, see Shiller [1996].8
Even professional financial managers seem to behave as if they lack appreciation of
long-term risks. Risks to present values of cash flows, rather than risks to cash flows in the
next quarter or year, should be the centerpiece of most risk management efforts. And yet,
evidence is that most risk management today concerns short-run or short-horizon concerns,
except where there already exist derivative markets for the present values themselves.
Of course, portfolio managers who protect their positions in equities from stock market
risk by shorting stock index futures are hedging themselves against risks to the present value
of the dividends paid by the firms. Here, it is not surprising that they would be hedging
present value risk, since as portfolio managers they are in the business of dealing with
highly-visible and tangible risks to the stock prices.
However, the nonfinancial firms themselves, who also take positions in derivative
markets to manage risks, seem less likely to concern themselves with present values, and
instead their hedging behavior is transactions-driven: firms tend to hedge only the risks that
are associated with specific contracts or anticipated transactions.
The Wharton School 1995 Survey of Derivatives Usage by U.S. Nonfinancial Firms
(Bodnar and Marston, 1996) surveyed 350 nonfinancial firms, 176 manufacturing firms, 77
primary products firms, and 97 service firms. They asked the firms who hedged what was
the most important objective of hedging strategy. The most commonly chosen answer,
chosen by 48% of respondents, was managing “cash flows,” followed by “accounting
earnings (42% of respondents). Only 8% chose “market value of firm” as the objective.
(An additional 1% chose “balance sheet accounts as the objective.) While there is a margin
for error in interpreting these answers, it appears that their choice of cash flows for their
most common answer reflects a short-run concern.9 Their second most common answer,
managing accounting earnings, appears to reflect a concern with maintaining appearances,
as indeed the authors of the study interpreted this answer.
The survey also asked respondents to describe the frequency of foreign currency
transactions by exposure category. Fifty percent of respondents said they frequently hedged
8

There is also a tendency for “money illusion,” a tendency to trust nominal, rather than inflationcorrected quantities, see Shafir, Diamond and Tversky [1997].
9

Some other studies have shown more encouraging views of the state of risk management by
firms, Dolde [1993], Culp and Miller [1995], however these studies concentrated on rather larger
firms.
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anticipated transactions expected in less than one year, while only 11% said they frequently
hedged transactions expected in more than a year. Forty-nine percent said they frequently
hedged contractual commitments, but only 8% said they hedged their competitive/economic
exposure. These results strongly suggest that firms use hedging only to deal with the most
concrete and tangible risks, such as the risks that affect their immediate cash flow, and
disregard more the important risks to all subsequent cash flows.10
If even the professionals running these firms are not properly motivated in their hedging
strategy by long-term considerations, then it may seem just too much to expect ordinary
individuals to appreciate the value of hedging vehicles that help them manage their longterm risks.
But let us not be too pessimistic. With proper “human engineering” of the instruments
and proper marketing it may be possible to encourage people to move to better risk
management.

Public Resistance to Individual Risk Management Devices
Even though effective risk management tools seem to have a long way to go before they are
accepted by the public, there is some reason for optimism that someday people can learn to
use better risk management methods. People now routinely pay for some risk management
contracts that were once unknown, for example life and health insurance contracts. Progress
has been made in individual risk management, and it is reasonable to hope for more progress
in the future.
Public resistance to new risk management products can be dealt with in the short run by
creating risk management products that are modifications of contracts that people already
pay for, and that incorporate enlightened risk management provisions as add-ons to existing
contracts. People may respond better to policies insuring them against adverse shocks to
their incomes if these policies are presented as add ons to their life insurance policies or
pension plans. People may well respond positively to home equity insurance, and to
insurance which is long term and which insures the real value rather than the nominal value
of the home, if it is an option to extend an existing mortgage or insurance contract.

Adding New Risk Management Features to Existing Contracts
I shall consider here five existing contracts that individuals enter in to on which new riskmanagement add-ons might be useful: home mortgages, homeowner’s insurance, life

10

Stulz [1995] offers a similar interpretation of the state of risk management by firms.
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insurance, disability insurance, and pension plans. All of these contracts share the characteristic that they are signed at times of important lifetime decision making. These are
good times for people to make other important risk hedging decisions as well, when they are
thinking of important issues, and thus when legal or other counsel is already available.
Any of these five existing contracts may thus, after suitable modification, serve as the
retail conduit of important new risk management schemes, and, ideally, the institutions who
take the other sides of these contracts would then in turn hedge the risks they acquire by
writing such contracts in new index-settled derivative markets such as income or real estate
futures or options markets. Our interest here is of course in the retail side of risk management, since individuals are themselves unlikely to participate directly in financial derivatives
contracts.
Home mortgages appear to be very useful instruments to take as a basis for new risk
management contracts, particularly for younger individuals. It was noted above that a
fundamental problem that young people face in hedging against shocks to their own future
income risks is that they do not have any wealth to put up as margin in any futures contract,
and they do not have much ability to commit their own future income to obtain such
collateral, because of bankruptcy laws. We shall suppose that these same bankruptcy laws
will also not permit mortgage contracts that they cannot also walk away from, if they will
accept losing the house. But, signing a mortgage contract is costly and difficult to do, and
so abrogation of such contracts is difficult, especially after the mortgage is partly paid off.
A home mortgage contract might be designed that lengthens/shortens the required
stream of payments and mortgage balance if income indices corresponding to that
homeowner increase/ decrease and if home prices in the homeowner’s neighborhood
increase/decrease, and, with less than one-to-one coverage, if the homeowner’s own income
and the selling price of the property itself increase/decrease. The contract might insure the
homeowner against fluctuations in real estate prices, and this would tend to eliminate the
disincentive that sometimes appears to sell the home if home prices fall. There is not likely
to be enough value in the homeowner’s commitment to the home to allow complete hedging
of the present value of income risk, but there ought to be some ability to do so.
Of course, with such a contract there is a risk that young people will see an increase in
their incomes just after they buy the house, so that their net worth in the contract turns
negative. Even if they do not wish to walk away from the contract, they may still be in
trouble should they desire to move, since they may now owe more than the value of the
house. However, the mortgage contract could require the mortgage lender to transfer the
terms to the next house that the person buys, to prevent a locked in effect. The contract
should also specify that if the homeowner chooses to refinance the mortgage with another
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lender, he or she would be required to make good on any losses incurred on the riskmanagement add-ons to the mortgage.
Homeowner’s Insurance in its present form is perhaps a less suitable contract on which
to add new risk management features because it is not naturally a long-term contract and
does not pledge the property as collateral, but the contract could be altered to pledge some
of the potential increased value of the house should real estate prices go up. Homeowner’s
insurance may be a useful contract to connect new home price risk management devices
with, since the concept of homeowner’s insurance might naturally lend itself in individuals’
minds with home price insurance.
Disability insurance might naturally be altered so that the payment if disabled in future
years takes account both of the insured’s potential income, if he or she had remained
employable, and possibly also the value of the insured’s home. There might be an advantage
to tying payments to disabled people’s income to an index of the occupational class to which
that person belongs, so as to reduce the moral hazard to affect disability should a decline in
the individual’s potential income make such moral hazard more serious a risk. On the other
hand, to the extent that such moral hazard is not an important factor, disability payments
might best be tied to an index of world income.
Life insurance policies would logically include a component that insures the beneficiary
against adverse turns in the beneficiary’s own income. Whole life insurance policies with
cash value have a natural source of margin, in effect, to be used for income futures contracts.
Pension plans offer different risk-management opportunities. Retired persons with most
or all of their income coming from investables would make very different use of risk
management contracts. With no labor income, they do not have the same incentive to make
investments that correlate negatively with labor income indices. Their expected social
security receipts might, however, be expected to respond to national income risks, given the
politics that determines these, and they may still have an incentive to take some risk
management position in their own national income. More generally, they would ideally
diversify their investments beyond just the traditional investments, and into claims on
income flows such as national incomes. Pension funds investing on their behalf may do this
for them.
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Table 1
Estimated Standard Deviations, Innovations and Present Values,
Using Real Per Capita GDPs, 54 Countries (percent)

Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Columbia
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Denmark
Dominica
Ecuador
Egypt
Finland
France
Germany (W)
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
India
Ireland
Iceland
Italy
Japan

S(I)

S(PV)

9.86
3.18
3.18
3.71
5.45
5.86
2.56
4.90
3.42
6.35
3.22
3.56
6.75
5.89
3.33
3.43
5.27
4.39
7.87
6.13
11.04
4.58
5.10
2.79
4.53
5.08
8.38

79.58
25.67
25.67
29.94
43.99
47.29
29.66
39.55
27.60
51.25
25.99
28.73
54.48
47.54
26.88
27.68
42.53
35.43
63.52
49.47
89.20
36.96
41.16
22.52
36.56
41.00
67.63

Kenya
Luxembourg
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
El Salvador
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Trinidad
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela

S(I)

S(PV)

4.40
2.40
6.20
6.01
3.01
4.72
2.85
10.74
2.21
3.07
7.08
6.11
11.06
3.68
7.00
9.20
8.68
6.60
3.75
4.33
5.02
8.75
3.59
1.14
1.62
4.44
9.18

35.51
19.37
50.04
48.51
24.29
38.09
23.00
86.68
17.84
24.78
57.14
49.31
89.26
29.70
56.50
74.25
70.05
53.27
30.27
34.95
40.52
70.62
28.97
9.20
13.07
35.83
74.09

Note: This table presents standard deviations computed by the author using annual data on real per
capita gross domestic products 1950–90 from the Penn World Table, Summers and Heston [1991],
using methods described in Shiller [1993]. For each country, a tenth-order autoregression was
estimated for the change in log real per capita GDP. From the estimated autoregressive model,
percentage standard deviations were derived using log-linear approximations derived in Campbell
and Shiller [1989]. S(I) is the estimated standard deviation (times 100 to convert to percent) of the
annual innovation in the (natural) log expected present value of real per capita GDP. S(PV) is the
estimated standard deviation (times 100) of the (natural) log time t present value of real per capita
GDP conditional on information as of time t. Thus, for example the estimated uncertainty for log
present value of real per capita GDP in Argentina is 79.58%. The annual discount factor used for
present values is 0.936.
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